Grades · 2025
Coaching decisions
How often a team goes for it on fourth down, against how the rest of the league plays the same distance and field position. Quarters one to three only, so desperation at the end of games does not contaminate it.
This measures deviation from league behaviour, not correctness. Calling a decision optimal needs a fourth-down model carrying its own assumptions, and presenting those assumptions as objectivity is how this kind of metric gets discredited.
| # | Team | Coach | 4th downs | Went | Expected | +/- | Rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Las Vegas | Pete Carroll | 105 | 21 | 10.3 | +10.7 | 20.0% |
| 2 | New York (J) | Aaron Glenn | 103 | 19 | 10.6 | +8.4 | 18.4% |
| 3 | Buffalo | Sean McDermott | 73 | 19 | 11.1 | +7.9 | 26.0% |
| 4 | Chicago | Ben Johnson | 99 | 21 | 13.3 | +7.7 | 21.2% |
| 5 | Carolina | Dave Canales | 93 | 20 | 12.8 | +7.2 | 21.5% |
| 6 | Kansas City | Andy Reid | 90 | 20 | 13.2 | +6.8 | 22.2% |
| 7 | Dallas | Brian Schottenheimer | 84 | 19 | 12.6 | +6.4 | 22.6% |
| 8 | New York (G) | Brian Daboll | 92 | 16 | 9.7 | +6.3 | 17.4% |
| 9 | Detroit | Dan Campbell | 84 | 18 | 11.8 | +6.2 | 21.4% |
| 10 | Indianapolis | Shane Steichen | 83 | 20 | 14.3 | +5.7 | 24.1% |
| 11 | Washington | Dan Quinn | 85 | 16 | 10.3 | +5.7 | 18.8% |
| 12 | New England | Mike Vrabel | 75 | 18 | 12.7 | +5.3 | 24.0% |
| 13 | Los Angeles (R) | Sean McVay | 82 | 21 | 15.9 | +5.1 | 25.6% |
| 14 | Atlanta | Raheem Morris | 94 | 15 | 10.0 | +5.0 | 16.0% |
| 15 | Tampa Bay | Todd Bowles | 90 | 16 | 11.4 | +4.6 | 17.8% |
| 16 | Jacksonville | Liam Coen | 82 | 15 | 11.2 | +3.8 | 18.3% |
| 17 | Baltimore | John Harbaugh | 82 | 10 | 6.5 | +3.5 | 12.2% |
| 18 | Green Bay | Matt LaFleur | 73 | 13 | 9.9 | +3.1 | 17.8% |
| 19 | Arizona | Jonathan Gannon | 83 | 10 | 7.1 | +2.9 | 12.0% |
| 20 | Cleveland | Kevin Stefanski | 105 | 13 | 10.5 | +2.5 | 12.4% |
| 21 | Miami | Mike McDaniel | 84 | 10 | 8.1 | +1.9 | 11.9% |
| 22 | Philadelphia | Nick Sirianni | 95 | 10 | 8.7 | +1.3 | 10.5% |
| 23 | San Francisco | Kyle Shanahan | 69 | 13 | 12.0 | +1.0 | 18.8% |
| 24 | Denver | Sean Payton | 92 | 10 | 9.2 | +0.8 | 10.9% |
| 25 | Pittsburgh | Mike Tomlin | 87 | 14 | 13.7 | +0.3 | 16.1% |
| 26 | Tennessee | Brian Callahan | 105 | 12 | 12.0 | +0.0 | 11.4% |
| 27 | Minnesota | Kevin O'Connell | 94 | 10 | 11.6 | -1.6 | 10.6% |
| 28 | Cincinnati | Zac Taylor | 83 | 8 | 10.3 | -2.3 | 9.6% |
| 29 | New Orleans | Kellen Moore | 95 | 13 | 15.6 | -2.6 | 13.7% |
| 30 | Los Angeles (C) | Jim Harbaugh | 95 | 8 | 11.4 | -3.4 | 8.4% |
| 31 | Houston | DeMeco Ryans | 109 | 12 | 15.6 | -3.6 | 11.0% |
| 32 | Seattle | Mike Macdonald | 77 | 9 | 13.0 | -4.0 | 11.7% |
The league moved
fourth and short, quarters 1–3| Season | Go rate | |
|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 15.6% | |
| 2016 | 15.9% | |
| 2017 | 15.2% | |
| 2018 | 19.6% | |
| 2019 | 23.9% | |
| 2020 | 25.4% | |
| 2021 | 28.9% | |
| 2022 | 25.8% | |
| 2023 | 27.0% | |
| 2024 | 30.2% | |
| 2025 | 32.2% |
Aggression repeats year to year at r = +0.444 across 320 team-seasons, so it is a real property of a coach rather than noise. But the league itself has changed: fourth-and-short go rate has risen from 15.6% in 2015 to 32.2% in 2025. A coach who was aggressive in 2016 would be below average today without changing a single conviction, so every figure has to be read against its own era.